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When we first meet Donny Ray Black,' we are sad because
we already know how his story will end. Donny Ray, though
only twenty-two years old,' is "horribly gaunt and emaciated,
hollow-cheeked, skin as bleached as chalk."3 He explains that
he has lost 50 of his former 160 pounds in eleven months.'
He wears "baggy jeans and a plain white tee shirt that drapes
and sags loosely over his skeleton."5 His eyes are "sunken,"
* Professor and Herff Chair of Excellence in Law, The University of Memphis.
B.S., Indiana State University, 1974; J.D., University of Michigan, 1977. I thank sever-
al faculty colleagues for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this essay:
Amanda Esquibel, William Kratzke, Irma Russell, and Kevin Smith. I also thank two
law students who serve as my research assistants, Michael Eisner and Jason Massie, for
their important contributions to the footnotes.
1. See JOHN GRISHAM, THE RAINMAKER 102 (1995).
2. See id. at 14. Rudy Baylor explains that Donny Ray's mother purchased a
health insurance policy for the family five years ago when the "boys," i.e., Donny Ray
and his identical twin brother Ronny Ray, were 17. Id.
3. Id. at 102.
4. Id. at 103.
5. Id. at 102.
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and his voice is "weak and raspy."'6 He suffers from acute
myelocytic leukemia,7 and the only mystery is how long he
will live.8 We wonder whether he will survive long enough to
know whether the Great Benefit Life Insurance Company
(Great Benefit Life) will be ordered to pay damages for having
denied him health insurance benefits under a policy issued to
his parents.
Fictional characters come and go, intriguing us for awhile
until we pick up our next novel. But Donny Ray stays with us
longer because he reminds us of friends or family members,
present or past, who were equally misfortuned to suffer in their
youth the random affliction of a fatal illness. The randomness
is cruel; there, but for the grace of God, could have gone any
one of us.
If we linger a second longer, we remind ourselves that each
of us must go sometime, either in an accident, or by illness, or
simply because the body wears out and an essential part of it
fails. If a life-threatening illness strikes, perhaps we will be
fortunate enough to discover that one of the truly wondrous
possibilities of modem medicine is available to save us. If we
are less fortunate, we may discover that our health insurance
policy does not cover the treatment for one reason or another
and that the treatment is so expensive as to be beyond our own
financial means. In other words, this part of the story of
Donny Ray could be about almost any one of us.
The core of the plot in The Rainmaker involves Rudy
Baylor's trial of a bad-faith claim against Great Benefit Life.9
6. Id.
7. Id. at 343; see also id. at 15 ("acute leukemia").
8. Donny Ray was diagnosed in August of "last year," or eight months ago, as
having acute leukemia. Id. at 15, 17. At that time, he was given a year to live, but it is
now doubtful that he will survive that long. Id. at 15. For a comprehensive discussion
of the characteristics, frequencies, and survival rates of various kinds of leukemias, see
Jose A. Hernandez et al., Leukemias, Myeloma, and Other Lymphoreticular Neoplasms,
75 CANCER 381 (1995).
9. The bad faith issue is the subject of Professor Widiss' essay in this collection.
See Alan I. Widiss, "Bad Faith" in Fact and Fiction: Ruminations on John Grisham's
Tale About Insurance Coverages, Punitive Damages, and the Great Benefit Life Insur-
ance Company, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 1377 (1996). I have written elsewhere about bad
1348 Vol. 26
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For the bad-faith plot to work effectively, the coverage and
claims processing issues cannot be close; without egregious
insurer conduct, there is no bad-faith plot to develop. Yet the
coverage issue in The Rainmaker, even if Great Benefit Life
must take a badly wrong and terribly weak position on every
question relevant to coverage, takes us to the vortex of some
of the most difficult issues facing our nation's health care
system.
I. THE STORY OF DONNY RAY
The story of Donny Ray's demise is actually quite simple.
When he is diagnosed as having acute leukemia, he is given
about a year to live.'" Desperately needing a bone marrow
transplant (BMT)," Donny Ray is ideally suited for such a
procedure; he has an identical twin brother who is willing to
donate his bone marrow to save his sibling. 2 The insurer,
however, refuses to pay for the procedure, which costs approxi-
mately $150,000.3 Lacking another way to pay for the treat-
ment, 4 the hospital discharges Donny Ray. 5 Repeated re-
quests to the insurer by his mother for coverage are denied.' 6
Months pass, and Donny Ray deteriorates, getting little medical
care because he cannot afford it.' 7 Eventually, enough months
pass to eliminate the BMT procedure as a viable option,"
faith claims against insurance companies and will not repeat any of those ideas here.
See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25G (1987); ROBERT
H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25G (2d ed., forthcoming 1996)
[hereinafter JERRY 1996]; Robert H. Jerry, II, The Wrong Side of the Mountain: A
Comment on Bad Faith's Unnatural History, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1317 (1994); Robert H.
Jerry, II, Remedying Insurers' Bad Faith Contract Performance: A Reassessment, 18
CONN. L. REV. 271 (1986).
10. GRISHAM, supra note 1, at 15.
11. Id. at 15-16, 345.
12. Id. at 14-15, 287-88.
13. Id. at 15-17, 26, 261, 298, 341.
14. Id. at 103.
15. Id. at 17.
16. Id. at 16, 26, 298, 341, 351-52, 361-62, 383-84.
17. Id. at 17.
18. Id. at 104.
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even if the insurer were to reverse its denial of coverage and
thereby enable Donny Ray to receive it. In late September,
some thirteen months after Donny Ray learned he was ill,
Rudy Baylor visits Donny Ray, now on his deathbed, and
observes, "So this is how the uninsured die." 9 A brief amount
of time passes, and on a Sunday morning, Donny Ray's mother
calls Rudy to give him the news that Donny Ray is dead.20
The insurer's denial of coverage is a major contributing factor
in, if not the outright cause of, Donny Ray's death because if
the BMT had been performed soon after the discovery of his
illness, the chances of Donny Ray surviving his illness were
fairly estimated at eighty to ninety percent. Without the trans-
plant, Donny Ray had no chance of surviving his illness.2'
The essence of the story is simpler still. Donny Ray needed
access to a high-cost treatment. Because he could not obtain
that access, he died. In that simple equation lie the twin im-
peratives of our nation's health care system-providing access
to adequate health care at an affordable cost. Although the
problems of access and affordability 22 are profoundly interre-
lated, their ramifications are perhaps best understood by reflect-
ing on each in turn. 23
19. Id. at 261.
20. Id. at 286.
21. See id. at 345-46 (testimony of Dr. Walter Kord, stating that the "increase [in]
the likelihood" that Donny Ray would survive acute leukemia would be 80% to 90%;
whereas, the chances of surviving without a transplant were zero; presumably, the doc-
tor meant that the 0% chance of surviving acute leukemia would increase with a BMT
to an 80% to 90% chance of survival).
22. It could be argued that there are three, not just two, variables in the mix. In
addition to access and affordability, adequacy-or quality--of health care is no less an
imperative of the health care delivery system. Nevertheless, I take it as a given that the
health care system is fully capable of delivering extraordinarily high-quality health
care. When the quality or adequacy of health care is compromised, it is more likely
that lack of access is the root problem. For example, to the extent access is rationed in
order to respond to excessive costs, the quality of care may suffer, not because high-
quality care is beyond the means of the system, but because the rationing causes delay
in obtaining care or denies the consumer access to more elaborate, more expensive
procedures. This is precisely the point of Donny Ray Black's story: a high-quality
treatment was available, but he lacked access to it because of its cost and because of
Great Benefit Life's denial of coverage.
23. The following discussion is an expanded treatment of the discussion in ROBERT
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II. THE PROBLEMS OF ACCESS AND AFFORDABILITY
The access issue is complicated, to put it mildly. The di-
mensions of the problem are usually described by reference to
the number of people in the nation who lack health insur-
ance.24 This makes sense: because health care is expensive,
lack of insurance can equate to lack of access to care.25 An
estimated 39.7 million Americans are thought to lack health
insurance of any kind at any particular time,26 but a closer
H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 64(c) (2d ed., forthcoming 1996).
24. When commentators refer to the number of uninsureds (typically a figure in
the range of 37 to 41 million people), the reference is to those who lack any kind of
private or public insurance (including Medicare, Medicaid, or Veterans Administration
benefits). See Emily Friedman, The Uninsured: From Dilemma to Crisis, 265 JAMA
2491 (1991). As Friedman explains, in theory, all Americans should have coverage
through one of four routes: Medicare for the elderly and disabled, Medicaid for the
indigent and some disabled citizens, employer-provided coverage, or individually-pur-
chased coverage if a person is ineligible for all of the other three categories. Medicaid,
however, reaches less than half of the poor, and many people under the age of 65 not
only lack employer-provided coverage but also are unable to afford their own. See id.
at 2492. Thus, it might be said that of the 215 million persons under age 65 in 1990,
about 17%, or 37 million, were without health insurance. See PAUL J. FELDSTEIN,
HEALTH POLICY ISSUES: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON HEALTH REFORM 258-61
(1994).
25. Those without private health insurance are less likely to obtain medical care
than those with private health insurance, demonstrating that public insurance programs
do not meet all the health care needs of the uninsured. For example, children without
health insurance are less likely to have routine doctor visits, to seek care for injuries, to
be appropriately immunized, and to have a regular source of medical care. U.S. Gener-
al Accounting Office, Health Insurance for Children-State and Private Programs Cre-
ate New Strategies to Insure Children, Rpt. No. GAO/HEHS 96-35 (Jan. 18, 1996). A
number of studies have documented that the uninsured, when hospitalized, receive
fewer services than insured patients and have a higher risk of dying while hospitalized.
Katherine Swartz, Dynamics of People Without Health Insurance, 271 JAMA 64
(1994); cf. Mark V. Pauly, Effectiveness Research and the Impact of Financial Incen-
tives on Outcomes, in POLICY AND MANAGEMENT: NINE IMPROVING HEALTH CRITICAL
RESEARCH ISSUES FOR THE 1990S, at 158-60 (Stephen M. Shortell & Uwe E. Reinhardt
eds., 1992) (arguing that the data are inconclusive on whether the absence of health
insurance affects health care outcomes).
26. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES, No. 169, at 118 (115th ed. 1995) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT]. Some estimates put the number at nearly 41 million. Ranks of Uninsured
Grow, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REV., Mar. 1995, at 45 (citing Employee Benefit
Research Institute study of figures from the March 1994 Current Population Survey).
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look shows this group to be both diverse and fluid. Not sur-
prisingly, the poor are disproportionately represented among the
uninsureds," as are minorities.28 Because most health insur-
ance is provided by employers as a fringe benefit in employee
compensation packages, those who are chronically unemployed
as well as those who are between jobs make up a significant
portion of the uninsured population.29 In addition, many unin-
sured people are employed, but in low-wage positions where
the employer does not offer health insurance.3" Likewise,
many young adults who have recently departed their parents'
households, where they were covered as dependents on one or
both parents' policies, are also uninsured.3 In short, the unin-
27. In 1993, 35% of Americans under the age of 65 with family incomes under
$14,000 were uninsured, as compared with 5% of those with family incomes of
$50,000 or more. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED
STATES 1994 CHART BOOK, Fig. 22 (1995) [hereinafter CHART BOOK].
28. In 1993, 23% of blacks were uninsured, as compared to 16% of whites. CHART
BOOK, supra note 27, at Fig. 22. According to the Statistical Abstract, 30.5 million
whites, or 14.2% of all whites, are estimated to lack insurance. In contrast, 9.3 million
blacks, constituting 20.5% of all blacks, are estimated to lack insurance. For the His-
panic population, the figures are 6.3 million and 31.6%, respectively. STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT, supra note 26, at 118.
29. By some estimates, the median length of time people remain uninsured is six
months, and 70% of all uninsureds acquire insurance within nine months. For some
people, the length of time without insurance can be quite short, perhaps a month or
less. See Swartz, supra note 25, at 64. The data, then, suggest an increasing number of
people who are "affected by the loss of health insurance-close to a quarter of the
nonelderly population are without health insurance sometime during a year." See id. at
65.
30. Perhaps as many as eight of every ten uninsureds are workers. Nearly 42% of
the uninsured population is in families headed by full-time, full-year employees. Alfred
G. Haggerty, 6.5 Million Californians Totally Uninsured, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER:
LIFE & HEALTH FIN. SERVICES, May 15, 1995, at 33. According to one source,
"[c]ompared with the mid-1980s, workers today are increasingly likely to be hired as
temporary or contingent workers or as self-employed 'contractors,' arrangements de-
signed in most cases to avoid providing health insurance and other benefits." Swartz,
supra note 25, at 66.
31. Young adults between the ages of 15 and 44 arc the most likely to be unin-
sured. In 1993, 22% of this age group was uninsured, a figure which rose 50% from
1980. CHART BOOK, supra note 27, at 35, Fig. 21. Of young adults between the ages
of 18 and 24, 26.8% of the population is estimated to be uninsured. STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT, supra note 26, at 118.
Great Benefit Life made a feeble and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to estab-
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sured population is much more diverse than most people real-
ize.
Lack of insurance is, however, only one facet of the access
issue. Many people who obtain insurance learn later that their
coverage has significant exclusions or limitations. For example,
most health insurance policies have preexisting condition claus-
es, which provide that insureds have no coverage, usually for a
specific period of time after a policy is issued, for illnesses or
conditions that predated the policy's effective date.3" Thus, a
person who changes jobs and obtains new insurance through a
new employer may find that his or her (or his or her
dependent's) existing condition is not covered by the new poli-
cy. Most policies also have deductibles or coinsurance clauses.
The presence of these loss-sharing clauses helps reduce the
premium charged for insurance. To the extent this makes insur-
ance more affordable, more people may be able to purchase it,
but the deductibles and coinsurance requirements themselves
may make it difficult for insureds to obtain health care if the
insured cannot afford the out-of-pocket payment. Some policies
have lifetime limits which place a cap on the insurer's total
payments under the policy; this leaves some insureds without
coverage for catastrophic illnesses or injuries once the policy
limits are exhausted.
The access issue is, however, even more involved than this.
Just because an individual lacks insurance or just because his
or her affliction falls within a gap in coverage, it does not
necessarily follow that the person receives no medical care. An
uninsured person may be more likely to forego preventive care,
but when that person suffers a very serious medical condition,
he or she is likely to go to a health care provider-most prob-
ably the emergency room of the nearest hospital-where that
person will receive treatment. If a person is too poor to have
insurance, then he or she will be too poor to pay the hospital's
lish that Donny Ray had lost his status as a dependent insured. See infra text accom-
panying notes 52-55.
32. This clause was asserted by Great Benefit Life as a reason for denying cover-
age to Donny Ray. See text accompanying notes 56-58.
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bill, and, even if the person is not indigent, the expenses of
even a short hospital stay are likely to exceed his or her ability
to pay. Hospitals and physicians write off some of these bills
as uncompensated professional services,33 but the cost of many
of these unpaid bills must be shifted to other paying patients, a
redistribution that increases the cost of care and hence the cost
of insurance for the insured population. As these costs rise,
some insureds lose their ability to afford coverage,34 and these
people become part of the uninsured population whose health
care expenses will, in turn, be shouldered by the remaining
insureds (or by taxpayers if the person is or becomes eligible
for Medicaid or a similar state program, such as TennCare).
Furthermore, the uninsured person who receives care at an
emergency room only after a condition has become acute re-
ceives one of the most expensive forms of medical care possi-
ble.3" The care is also inefficient36 in at least two respects.
First, it would have been better to treat the person's condition
earlier when it would have been less expensive to do so, rather
than delay to a point when more expensive treatments are
needed. Second, it is inefficient to use trauma centers to treat
ear or sinus infections, even painful ones.37 To add to the
33. For discussion of the frequency of charity care in hospitals, see Edward C.
Norton & Douglas 0. Staiger, How Hospital Ownership Affects Access to Care for the
Uninsured, 25 RAND J. OF ECON. 171, 173-74 (1994); R.G. Frank & D.S. Salkever,
The Supply of Charity Services by Nonprofit Hospitals: Motives and Market Structure,
22 RAND J. OF ECON. 430-45 (1991).
34. See Haggerty, supra note 30, at 33 (noting that with continued erosion of em-
ployer-funded health insurance in California and nationally, the number of uninsureds
keeps increasing).
35. "[T]he cost of [emergency department] visits is almost double that of other
substitutable forms of ambulatory care .... When [emergency department] visits sub-
stitute for physician office visits, which seems to be a pattern among poorer patients,
and assuming there are no differences in health outcomes, excess costs may be gener-
ated." Scott A. Optenberg et al., Emergency Care Episodes: An Economic Profile, J.
OF AMBULATORY CARE MGMT., Jan. 1995, at 1.
36. As used here, efficiency refers "to the relationship between the aggregate bene-
fits of a situation and the aggregate costs of the situation." A. MITCHELL POLINSKY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (2d ed. 1989). If a situation is ineffi-
cient, the situation can be changed so that someone will be benefitted without hurting
anyone else. Id. at 7 n.4.
37. "More than half of the 89.8 million emergency department visits made in 1992
Vol. 261354
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problem, an uninsured who is a rational economic actor is
unwilling to invest his or her first discretionary dollars in
health insurance when he or she knows that free care is avail-
able at the emergency room or from other health care provid-
ers. This is particularly true of young adults who tend to be
healthy and, therefore, do not perceive a need for health insur-
ance; for many such persons, making a monthly car payment
may seem to have more utility than paying a health insurance
premium. To the extent young, healthy people do not purchase
insurance, the insured population tends to be older and, there-
fore, more prone to use health care services. This makes health
insurance relatively more expensive, which makes it even less
likely that a young, healthy adult will perceive health insurance
to be a sensible investment.
The issue of health care's affordability is no less intransi-
gent. The statistics quickly become dated, but the trends are
unmistakable and widely documented: as a percentage of gross
domestic product, total spending on health care has increased
significantly;38 health care costs are growing at about twice
the general rate of inflation;39 per-family spending for health
care as a percentage of total family income has increased sig-
nificanty;40 and spending on health care is consuming an ev-
were for non-urgent care." Laurence C. Baker & Linda Schuurman Baker, Excess Cost
of Emergency Department Visits for Nonurgent Care, 13 HEALTH AFFAIRS 162 (1994)
(citing L.F. McCaig, National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey: 1992 Emer-
gency Dept. Summary, Advance Data from Vital Health Statistics of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Nat'l Center for Health Statistics (Mar. 2, 1994)).
38. In 1992, health care accounted for 13.6% of U.S. gross domestic product
(GDP), a significant increase from the 1980 figure of just over 9%. The percentage of
GDP devoted to health care in the United States is greater than that of any other devel-
oped country. Germany and Japan, for example, had percertages of 8.7% and 6.9%,
respectively. This translated to per capita expenditures in 1992 in the United States of
$3,086, compared to $1,376 in Japan. Despite the additional expenditures in the United
States, the infant mortality rate in Japan is half that of the United States, and life ex-
pectancy at birth in the United States is 4.4 years less for U.S. males than Japanese
males and 3.9 years less for U.S. females than Japanese females. See CHART BOOK, su-
pra note 27, at 30, Fig. 16.
39. From 1980 to 1994, the medical care inflation rate averaged 7.7% annually,
compared with 4.3% for all items in the consumer price index. CHART BOOK, supra
note 27, at 32, Fig. 18.
40. As a share of current consumption (defined as total expenditures minus gifts
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er-increasing percentage of the federal budget.4' Of course,
increased spending on health care is not necessarily cause for
alarm if the increased expenditures simply reflect the desire of
a more affluent society to spend more on health care than on
other goods and services. In other words, spending a lot on
something is not necessarily bad if this reflects a conscious,
voluntary allocation of resources, in the same sense that if peo-
ple like to play golf often, people will spend a disproportionate
amount of their wealth on golf.42
Receiving medical care is not, of course, the same thing as
playing golf. People do not aspire to receive more health care
in the same way they aspire to play more golf, own a new car,
purchase a cellular phone, etc. But when health care is needed,
people usually want the very best care possible. Depending on
the circumstances, this may mean receiving large quantities of
care, the attention of the highest quality (and most expensive)
specialists, elaborate tests, etc.43 In other words, health care is
outside the family, cash contributions, personal insurance, and pensions), out-of-pocket
health care expenditures peaked at 6.7% in 1960-1961, declined to 5.4% in 1972-1973,
rose to 5.7% in 1988-1989, and rose to 6.9% in 1993. The decline through the late
1960s and early 1970s was presumably due to the Medicare program. Geoffrey D.
Paulin & Wolf D. Weber, The Effects of Health Insurance on Consumer Spending,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1995, at 34, 34.
41. Federal health spending is forecast to increase from 16.1% of total federal ex-
penditures in 1992 to 23.6% in 1998. The federal government is responsible for Medi-
care and one-half of the cost of caring for the indigent under the Medicaid program. In
state government budgets, Medicaid expenditures are rising more rapidly than any
other state expenditure. FELDSTEIN, supra note 24, at 17.
42. Indeed, the aging of the U.S. population has major implications for health care
expenditures. As a greater portion of the U.S. population consists of elderly persons,
the population as a whole requires more medical services. Id. at 21.
43. This description does not, of course, fit everyone. Some people simply do not
like to go to doctors, regardless of their illness or other circumstances. Some people
are satisfied with a minimum amount of high quality care, assuming this degree of
intervention resolves the ailment. All things being equal, I would prefer that my physi-
cian spare no expense to cure a persistent earache, but I tend to avoid visiting the
doctor for such afflictions at all, even though the out-of-pocket cost to me for such
services is de minimis. This is because large quantities of time are lost anytime I visit
my physician. This is, of course, an access problem: to keep my premiums low, my
health maintenance organization (HMO) has an extremely large patient membership,
which frequently leads to long waits in the physicians' offices, which is a cost-lost
time-that deters me from seeking care (that is, I consider lost time a greater cost than
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a peculiar kind of consumable; when a parent's child is ill, a
parent is likely to insist on the very best care available, regard-
less of cost. When faced with a life-or-death illness or injury,
few people make medical care decisions motivated primari-
ly--or even significantly-by cost. Indeed, many, and perhaps
most, people prefer extensive medical care when faced with
life-threatening illnesses, even if much of the care only extends
life briefly with no chance of altering an inevitable outcome.
All these motivations are understandable, but it means that the
incentives to consume medical care differ from the reasons one
has to purchase cars, movie tickets, and other consumer goods
and services."
Yet, even if some portion of increased expenditures for
health care reflects an increase that is "desired" by most peo-
ple, much of the increased expenditure occurs because health
care costs more. In other words, cost containment is a problem
in health care, and it translates directly into reduced
affordability of health care services.
The affordability problem has many dimensions. Few would
question that large segments of the current system have exces-
sively high administrative costs. 45 We praise the effectiveness
the annoyance of the earache). If the earache goes away on its own, as most of them
do, the HMO saves money (thereby permitting lower premiums) by deterring my visit.
This outcome is efficient, however, only if these savings exceed the additional costs
incurred by patients who delay the receipt of health care for minor afflictions until the
conditions become more serious and, hence, much more expensive to treat.
44. The situation is, of course, somewhat more complicated than this. The incen-
tives to consume care to address health care needs differ from the incentives to receive
preventive care. In other words, most people want a minimum amount of care (e.g.,
periodical physical examinations, immunizations, mammograms, EKGs, etc.) in order
to reduce the risk of a catastrophic, serious illness. Few people are motivated to receive
10 EKGs a year. The amount of preventive care thought optimal is likely to be affect-
ed by education, the physician's recommendations (to the extent supplier-induced de-
mand exists, see infra note 49, an above-optimal amount of preventive care may be
ordered), and the time-costs of receiving the care. Yet whether a person has health
insurance is, apparently, directly related to the amount of preventive care received. See
note 25.
45. This problem is, of course, more complicated than the text allows. For exam-
ple, the advent of "managed care" and "managed care organizations," such as HMOs
and PPOs (preferred provider organizations), is a direct consequence of the cost prob-
lem. To the extent many health services rendered are thought to be unnecessary or
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of new technologies, but their use increases the cost of medical
care. Although the magnitude of the effect is vigorously debat-
ed, many people believe that the legal system encourages
enough unnecessary medical care to affect the cost of health
care paid by everyone. 6 Unnecessary duplication of expensive
medical technologies also increases costs. To illustrate, it is
doubtful that each of two adjacent hospitals in most urban
centers needs an open-heart surgery capability. It is doubtful
that every county in rural areas of the Central Plains needs a
hospital, but the controversy over this issue is easy to imagine.
The resident of a county with an under-utilized hospital that
should be closed does not want the ambulance to have to trav-
el an extra fifty miles to reach the neighboring county's hospi-
tal after his or her heart attack. But if an under-utilized hospi-
tal is kept open and consolidation is spurned, then the cost of
each service must go up in order to pay for the excess over-
head. The extent to which the health care industry is sufficient-
ly competitive is much discussed; some believe that certain
parts of the industry, such as drug companies, earn excess
profits, while others view high drug prices as necessary to
cover the high costs of bringing new drugs to the market. Each
of these cost factors is complex, and the extent to which each
contributes to the problem of affordability is much debated.
Perhaps the most important factor increasing the cost of
inappropriate, thereby driving up overall system-wide costs, managed care, through
review or intervention, seeks to deter health care providers from prescribing unneces-
sary or inappropriate treatments. Managed care may also involve a managed care orga-
nization negotiating, on behalf of a large group of consumers, with health care provid-
ers to receive discounted prices for services. Thus, managed care often requires new or
additional administrative mechanisms, which have the effect of increasing administra-
tive costs. If these additional administrative costs result in net savings to the health
care system, then the increased administrative costs are desirable.
46. A 1993 study of the Competition Center of the Hudson Institute claimed that
legal liability expenses added $450 to the average patient's hospital bill in a large ur-
ban hospital in Indiana and that defensive medicine accounted for 3.9% of the
hospital's total operating expenditures. On the other hand, a 1994 report of the Office
of Technology Assessment labeled earlier estimates of the cost of defense medicine
"unreliable" and found that less than 8% of all diagnostic procedures were consciously
defensive. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE REPORTS
(Ruth Gastel ed., 1996).
1358 Vol. 26
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medical care is the one most deeply entrenched. The federal
tax code allows employers to deduct health insurance provided
as a fringe benefit to employees, and the benefit is excluded
from the employee's income. This has greatly increased the
amount of health insurance in force, which has greatly in-
creased the demand for health care: to the extent an insured's
decision to consume health care is motivated by cost consider-
ations, an insured who has eighty percent of his or her health
care bill covered by insurance will continue to consume health
care until an additional one dollar of health care services is
worth less than twenty cents to the insured. This translates into
an enormous increase in demand for health care services: total
health care expenditures increase, and to the extent demand
rises faster than supply, prices must increase. When to this
increased demand for services is added the increased demand
generated by government-funded health care programs (i.e.,
Medicare and Medicaid, or Medicaid substitutes in some
states), a simple supply-demand curve predicts significant in-
creases in price, which means health care's affordability is
reduced.
Moreover, even if every bit of health care services currently
consumed were voluntarily and willingly purchased in a per-
fectly functioning market, the percentage of federal and state
governmental budgets devoted to health care would be a seri-
ous concern.47 Neither the federal nor state government can
continue to increase spending for health care without either
increasing taxes (a politically unpopular and often impossible
option), increasing the size of budget deficits (which creates
another diverse set of problems), or cutting expenditures for
other government programs (an extraordinarily difficult and
perhaps impossible strategy). Thus, even if the health care
system currently operated with perfect efficiency, governments
would still be searching for ways to reduce the cost of, and
hence expenditures for, health care.48
The problems of access and affordability are, of course,
47. See supra notes 41-42.
48. See FELDSTEIN, supra note 24, at 17-19.
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interrelated: when the price of health care increases, more peo-
ple find health care unaffordable, which further reduces access.
When access is provided for those for whom cost is otherwise
an insurmountable barrier, systemwide expenditures for health
care inevitably increase. These additional expenses must be
paid by someone, but there are few alternatives. Physicians and
hospitals might provide the care without charge; indeed, the
amount of uncompensated care provided by health care profes-
sionals is large. But it is unrealistic to expect health care pro-
viders to provide the uninsured population with all their health
care needs for free.
Two alternatives remain. First, higher prices can be charged
to those who already pay for health care, in effect making the
group of people who receive care in today's system subsidize
the care of those who lack access. To the extent the higher
prices are paid through an insurance mechanism, the additional
insurance payouts must be funded through higher premiums
charged to the insured population, which further constricts the
affordability of insurance.
Second, the government could provide the subsidy rather
than impose the burden only on those who receive health care.
In other words, those who lack access might be assisted
through either publicly provided or publicly compensated health
care. This would spread the cost of the subsidy across the tax
base, with whatever distributive consequences result from feder-
al or state tax policies. This approach, however, adds to tax
burdens at a time when the prevailing mood in our country is
that the governmental role (and the concomitant tax burden)
should be decreased, not expanded.
Sadly, no alternative resonates much excitement, or even
hope. Once the generosity of health care providers is exhaust-
ed, the cost of providing health care services to the uninsured
can be paid either with higher prices charged to insureds or
with government funds provided through the tax base, or some
combination of the two. Moreover, whatever mechanism is used
to increase access to health care services, the increased demand
for health care leads to higher prices, which has the ironic
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effect of compounding the access problem.4 9
III. CAUGHT IN THE CROSS-CURRENTS: How INSURERS COPE
Insurance companies like Great Benefit Life are in the mid-
dle of all of this.5" Insurers must collect sufficient premiums
to cover payments and administrative costs and (if not a not-
for-profit company) to earn a reasonable profit. Employers
purchase most health insurance under group arrangements for
the benefit of their employees; with health insurance making up
an increasing percentage of employers' total expenses, 51 em-
49. In this discussion, it is assumed that access for the uninsured will not be in-
creased by reducing benefits for the insured population-a solution which merely trans-
fers some of one group's access to another group, i.e., the group lacking access. Such a
solution would not increase demand, but would merely shift the access problem, not
solve it. See Rashid L. Bashshur et al., Beyond the Uninsured: Problems in Access to
Care, 32 MEDICAL CARE 409, 410 (1994) (arguing that some recently proposed solu-
tions to the problems of the uninsured reduce benefits to insureds, "thereby inadver-
tently decreasing access overall").
Merely increasing the supply of health care does not guarantee that prices will
fall. The impact of the increased supply of physicians in recent years illustrates the
point. Some commentators believe that physicians act in their own self-interest to pro-
tect their own incomes, which means that physicians will prescribe additional services
to increase their revenue. This theory of physician behavior, called "supplier-induced
demand," is controversial, but there is some evidence to support the notion that in-
creasing the supply of physicians also increases demand. The competing theory con-
siders the physician a "perfect agent" for the insured, meaning that the physician will
act in the insured's interest. To the extent insurance pays for the insured's treatment,
the physician as a perfect agent will prescribe services where the costs outweigh the
benefits, thus increasing demand and adding to system-wide costs. See FELDSTEIN, su-
pra note 24, at 35-39; MARK V. PAULY ET AL., PAYING PHYSICIANS: OPTIONS FOR
CONTROLLING COST, VOLUME, AND INTENSITY OF SERVICES 35-45 (1992).
50. The fictitious Great Benefit Life is a commercial insurer, of which there are
about 350 that sell health insurance in the United States. See WARREN GREENBERG,
COMPETITION, REGJLATION, AND RATIONING IN IEAILTtH CARE 48 (1991). The other
kinds of private health insurance are Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans, self-funded employ-
er plans, and prepaid plans (such as HMOs). See generalli BARRY R. FURROW FT AL.,
HEALTH LAW § I1-1, at 498-502 (1995).
51. Between 1991 and 1994, the percentage of total employer-provided compensa-
tion devoted to health insurance in goods-producing industries rose from 6.9% to 8. 1%;
in manufacturing, the percentage rose from 7.5 to 8.6; in services, the percentage rose
from 5.5% to 6.0%. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH UNITED STATES 1994, Table 122, at 227
(1995).
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ployers exert pressure on insurers to keep premiums low. Indi-
vidual consumers often act likewise. To compete, insurers must
try to accommodate this desire, but it necessarily follows, in a
market where costs of services are increasing, that stable pre-
miums are likely to be accompanied by either reductions in
coverage or at least constraints on expansion of coverage.
In The Rainmaker, Great Benefit Life responds to these
pressures in the most extreme manner imaginable by adhering
to a corporate policy of initially denying coverage in virtually
all cases and citing highly dubious and sometimes overtly
frivolous grounds. The actual reasons Great Benefit Life denied
coverage to Donny Ray were different: the proposed treatment
was expensive; neither Donny Ray nor his parents were expect-
ed to challenge the denial of coverage; and Great Benefit Life
anticipated profit from its behavior. Yet as the reader reacts
with anger to the consequences of Great Benefit Life's misera-
bly callous conduct, he or she should not lose sight of the fact
that the grounds asserted by Great Benefit Life for denying
coverage-the definition of "insured," the preexisting condition
clause, the misrepresentation defense, and the experimental
treatment exclusion-are important, even essential tools in
many other settings where insurers have legitimate reasons for
limiting their obligations to their insureds.
One of the first reasons asserted by Great Benefit Life for
denying coverage to Donny Ray Black is that he, as an adult,
was not a covered dependent under his parents' policy." Of
course, insurance does not extend without limitation to cover
anyone with any kind of relationship to a named insured. For
example, a common provision in health insurance policies de-
fines persons eligible for coverage as the named insured, the
named insured's spouse, and "unmarried dependent children
(including stepchildren and legally adopted children) under 19
years of age."53 No one seriously questions the right of in-
52. GRISHAM, supra note I, at 26.
53. Family Hospital Expense and Surgical Policy, Form IM 6187, in ALLIANCE OF
AMERICAN INSURERS, THE INSURANCE PROFESSIONALS' POLICY KIT: A COLLECTION
OF SAMPLE INSURANCE FORMS 95 (1994-1995).
Definitions of "dependent" can, of course, be more elaborate. Consider, for ex-
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surers to place such limitations in their policies. Indeed, it is
important that the persons entitled to assert coverage under an
insurance contract be clearly designated and that the insurer
have a certain basis for calculating an appropriate premium for
a highly material fact-the number of people covered by a
policy. The relationship of this named insured and the depen-
dent that gives rise to coverage under standard policy language
does not last forever, and no one controverts the proposition
that a person who ceases to fit the definition of dependent or
to meet a minimum age requirement is not entitled to coverage
under his or her parents' policy.
The health insurance policy in The Rainmaker does not,
however, contain a provision terminating the coverage for
Donny Ray when he reaches a certain age.54 We are to as-
sume, apparently, that the policy's definition of "insured" cov-
ered the named insured and any "dependent children." Donny
Ray and his brother undoubtedly fell within the classification
"dependent children" at the time the policy was issued; both
boys were seventeen and lived at home. Because Donny Ray
ample, the definition of "dependent" in the policy at issue in Kornman v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Louisiana, 662 So. 2d 498 (La. Ct. App. 1995), writ denied, 667
So. 2d 1054 (La. 1996):
"Dependent" means a Member for whom current fees have been paid and
is:
the Employee's legal spouse; and
any unmarried child who:
-is under 19 years old;
-is 19 years old but less than 25 years old, if enrolled in school as a
full-time student in a secondary school, college, university, vocational,
technical, trade school or institute and primarily supported by the Em-
ployee.
-is mentally or physically disabled prior to attaining either of the lim-
iting ages shown above and who is incapable of self-support.
-qualifies as the Employee's or Employee's spouse's dependent for pur-
poses of the most current calendar year's federal income tax laws and
regulations.
Id. at 503.
54. During her initial meeting with Rudy Baylor, Donny Ray's mother commented
that she had read the policy several times and had found no language terminating her
dependents' coverage upon their reaching a certain age. GRISHAM, supra note I, at 16.
The policy listed two dependents, Donny Ray and his twin brother. Id. at 15.
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never left home, he never lost his status as a "dependent" even
though he had reached the age of majority by the time his
leukemia was diagnosed.5 There was simply no support for
Great Benefit Life's position that Donny Ray was not within
the definition of persons entitled to coverage under the policy.
Another reason Great Benefit Life offered in support of its
denial of coverage was that Donny Ray Black had a preexist-
ing condition, 6 which caused him to lose coverage under the
preexisting condition clause, a provision found in almost all
health insurance policies. 7 Although the precise language of
the clause varies from policy to policy, its effect is to exclude
coverage for sickness or illness commencing before the effec-
tive date of coverage.58
Insurers insert preexisting condition clauses in policies to
help control adverse selection. 9 Obviously, if an insured could
obtain coverage for a current illness or condition by purchasing
insurance, he or she would wait until the illness or condition
occurred to obtain insurance. Thus, insureds would pay nothing
(and insurers would collect nothing) for the periods during
which insureds are healthy. If insurers sought to solve this
problem simply by excluding coverage for illnesses suffered by
the insured on the first day of coverage, insureds would have
an incentive to conceal their illnesses, claiming they arose after
the policy's effective date. Thus, preexisting condition clauses
55. Counsel for Great Benefit Life explored this issue in the deposition of Donny
Ray Black, but was unable to elicit any fact tending to show that Donny Ray left home
to live elsewhere for any period of time, even a period as short as a week. Id. at 237.
56. Id. at 26.
57. This discussion is substantially based on JERRY 1996, supra note 9, § 103.
58. One typical clause defined a preexisting condition as follows: "[Any condition
that was diagnosed or treated by a physician within 24 months prior to the effective
date of the coverage or produced symptoms within 12 months prior to the effective
date of coverage that would have caused an ordinary prudent person to seek medical
diagnosis or treatment." See Holub v. Holy Family Soc'y, 518 N.E.2d 419, 420 (I11.
App. Ct. 1987).
59. Adverse selection refers to the phenomenon that results in an insurer's pool of
insureds inevitably being composed of a disproportionately high number of less desir-
able risks. This results from the greater tendency of higher-risk people to seek insur-
ance because they receive a better return on their premium investment than lower-risk
people. See JERRY 1996, supra note 9, § 10[c][2].
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have a broader function than simple exclusions for illnesses
active on the first day of coverage; preexisting condition
clauses combat the fraud and concealment that would occur in
the absence of such clauses. 6' By the same analysis, the pres-
ence of a preexisting condition clause, if it is known and un-
derstood, encourages consumers to purchase insurance when
they are healthy. Thus, it is fair to assert that preexisting con-
dition clauses eliminate coverage for illnesses or conditions that
motivate the first acquisition of insurance. Through this re-
sponse to adverse selection, the preexisting condition clause
plays an important role in reducing the cost of coverage.
With respect to a consumer's initial purchase of health in-
surance, the cost-reducing benefits of the preexisting condition
clause are apparent. The clause is problematic, however, when
applied to a person who, already having health insurance,
switches employers (and hence insurers or insurance policies)
and then confronts a preexisting condition clause once again.
At best, this situation will create a gap in coverage, thereby
exacerbating the problem of access to health care. At worst, the
clause constrains the movement of employees in labor markets;
employees with health conditions (or employees who have de-
pendents with health conditions) may not be able to afford to
improve their employment status if doing so means they must
forfeit coverage for preexisting medical conditions.
No single insurer can be expected to voluntarily incur the
adverse selection costs generated by eliminating the preexisting
condition clause; indeed, such an insurer would attract a dispro-
portionate number of bad risks (i.e., people who having already
suffered an illness or condition are now motivated to purchase
insurance) and would have to raise premiums above the level
of its competitors. Because the preexisting condition clause, and
the gap in coverage it creates, is unlikely to disappear given
the normal operation of ordinary market forces, governmental
regulation of the clause is appropriate-specifically, regulation
that would prohibit such clauses in health insurance policies,
except for persons who are acquiring health insurance for the
60. See Mogil v. California Physicians Corp., 267 Cal. Rptr. 487 (Ct. App. 1990).
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first time.61
If there ever was a case where the insurer's reliance on the
preexisting condition clause should be rejected, The Rainmaker
presents those facts. Donny Ray's leukemia was diagnosed
more than four years after the Great Benefit Life policy was
issued.6 2 Even if Donny Ray had symptoms before the diagno-
sis that should have put him on notice that he had a serious
ailment, these symptoms would not have arisen at or near the
time of the policy's issuance. In short, there is no adverse
selection in The Rainmaker; indeed, Donny Ray's mother ob-
served that the family had never even sought benefits until
Donny Ray's illness.63
Moreover, the decided cases stand squarely in Donny Ray's
favor. Courts have generally held that preexisting condition
clauses apply only to conditions about which the insured was
aware on or before the policy's effective date. Thus, an illness
that the insured did not recognize as such, or that had not
manifested symptoms sufficient to inform the insured about the
presence of the ailment, does not fall within the clause. 4 This
protects insureds from losing benefits on account of unknown
preexisting conditions. At the same time, it furthers the purpose
61. As of May 1996, both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate
had passed bills that would regulate exclusions for preexisting conditions. The pro-
posed law would generally allow health plans to deny coverage for preexisting condi-
tions for up to 12 months, but would reduce the 12-month period by the amount of
time a new employee was covered under prior health plans. Although this proposal has
widespread support, prospects for its ultimate enactment are uncertain due to differenc-
es between the House and Senate versions on other issues. See Kathy Kristof, A Con-
tinuous Chain of Health Insurance Proposals Limit Use of Pre-Existing Condition
Clauses That Can Make It Difficult to Switch Jobs or Medical Plans, CHI. TRIB., May
8, 1996; Robert Pear, Health Care Bill Draws Opposition on Key Provisions, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 1996, at 6, col. 6. This proposal, if enacted, will have the effect of
limiting the impact of the exclusion to persons acquiring health insurance for the first
time or upgrading to more comprehensive plans.
62. GRISHAM, supra note 1, at 14-15.
63. Id. at 15.
64. See, e.g., State v. Carper, 545 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 1989) (policy excludes only con-
ditions that manifest themselves prior to date of coverage); Holub v. Holy Family
Soc'y, 518 N.E.2d 419 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (insured who had minor bowel symptoms
and who was told by doctor she had "nothing to worry about," but who in fact had
rectal cancer, had coverage despite preexisting condition clause).
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of the preexisting condition clause-to protect insurers from
adverse selection; an insured who is unaware of an illness can-
not be motivated by adverse selection considerations to acquire
insurance.65
Great Benefit Life made a feeble attempt to convert the
preexisting condition defense into a misrepresentation defense:
at the time of the application, Great Benefit Life asserted that
no disclosure was made of a doctor's visit which Donny Ray
had made to the doctor for treatment for the flu.6 6 It is, of
course, often appropriate for an insurer to deny coverage based
on an insured's misrepresentation in an application. Indeed,
insurers ask applicants numerous questions about their prior
health history for the purpose of gathering information upon
which an insurer will rely when determining whether it wishes
to issue a policy and assume the risk. Some answers will moti-
vate the insurer to undertake follow-up investigation; in other
circumstances, the insurer simply might rely on the accuracy of
the information provided by the insurer. If the applicant mis-
represents, either intentionally or negligently, material informa-
tion that induces the insurer to issue a policy that it would not
have otherwise issued or to issue a policy at a premium that
would have been adjusted had the insurer known the true facts,
then the insurer enjoys a defense to coverage.67
65. There is, of course, a risk that a person may apply for insurance and understate
the significance of symptoms about which he or she, at the time the insurance was
sought, actually had great concern. Thus, some courts have held that a condition
thought to be minor but found to be more significant after the policy's issuance may
trigger the preexisting condition clause. See, e.g., Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Atallah, 45
F.3d 512 (1st Cir. 1995) (preexisting condition clause does not require insured to sus-
pect a particular diagnosis; if insured experiences symptoms, whatever illness is ulti-
mately determined to have caused those symptoms is a preexisting condition and is
excluded from coverage; no exception exists for insured who in good faith obtained an
incomplete or incorrect diagnosis and therefore failed to disclose the full extent of the
illness before purchasing insurance); Mogil v. California Physicians Corp., 267 Cal.
Rptr. 487 (Ct. App. 1990) (cancerous mole was preexisting condition, in circumstances
where insured's prior moles had been benign but insured knew that moles needed con-
tinued monitoring). But these circumstances did not exist in Donny Ray's situation
either.
66. GRISHAM, supra note 1, at 296.
67. For a more complete discussion of the misrepresentation defense, see JERRY
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Great Benefit Life's claim that Donny Ray's prior health
history was misrepresented is flawed for two reasons. First,
Donny Ray's failure to disclose a minor flu condition was not
material, and immaterial misrepresentations do not provide a
basis for an insurer to void a policy.68 Second, Great Benefit
Life did not rely on the misrepresentation. It would have issued
the policy anyway; indeed, insurers do not rely on immaterial
misrepresentations.
The last reason offered by Great Benefit Life for denying
coverage to Donny Ray Black is the experimental treatment
exclusion. 69 In taking this position Great Benefit Life is clear-
ly wrong. The efficacy of BMT treatment for acute leukemia is
well established; the survival rates exceed fifty percent if the
cancer is caught early enough.7" It may have been overly opti-
mistic for Donny Ray to assert that he would definitely have
been cured had the BMT treatment been performed,7 but it
cannot be doubted that the BMT would have greatly increased
Donny Ray's chances of survival in circumstances where he
1996, supra note 9, § 102.
68. GRISHAM, supra note 1, at 296. As explained more fully there, even a fraudu-
lent immaterial misrepresentation is unlikely to invalidate the coverage. Id. Even so,
there was no indication anywhere in The Rainmaker that Mrs. Black's failure to dis-
close on the application that Donny Ray had once had the flu, an illness that afflicts
virtually everyone at one time or another, constituted a willful attempt to deceive Great
Benefit Life.
69. Portions of the following discussion are based on JERRY 1996, supra note 9.
70. See Thomas H. Maugh II, Improving the Odds, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1996, at
B2 (reporting a recent large study at a Seattle cancer research center showing that the
five-year survival rate for leukemia patients who received a BMT was 50%, compared
to 20% for those who received chemotherapy or radiation alone); Wisconsin Bone-Mar-
row Transplant Success Improves Slightly as Leukemia Treatment, CANCER WEEKLY,
Aug. 17, 1992 (use of BMT to cure leukemia became "modestly more successful dur-
ing the 1980s, reaching a 57 percent survival rate in cases caught early enough," ac-
cording to a new study of 7,788 sibling BMTs reported by 185 transplant teams world-
wide; survival rates were 36% for intermediate leukemia, and 18% for advanced leuke-
mia; "survival" was defined as no recurrence of leukemia two years after the trans-
plant).
71. GRISHAM, supra note 1, at 103 (Donny Ray states that "[t]he transplant
would've saved my life"); id. at 104 (Donny Ray states that if he had received the
BMT six months earlier, he would have had a 90% chance of cure); id. at 345 (Dr.
Kord testifies that a BMT for Donny Ray would have increased his likelihood of sur-
viving acute leukemia by 80% to 90%).
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had no chance for survival without it.
Although Great Benefit Life had little or no basis for as-
serting the experimental treatment exclusion, this facet of the
plot invites a more substantial question: what exactly is it that
made the BMT treatment nonexperimental? After all, barely
half of all people who are identified as well-suited for BMT
for acute leukemia in circumstances where the cancer is caught
in its early stages and who then receive the treatment are
cured. If the cancer is more advanced, the cure rates decline to
levels well below 50%.72 One crude, but correct, answer as-
serts that the line must be drawn somewhere. So, when scien-
tifically validated evidence that a particular regimen reliably
and consistently produces a 40% cure rate for a defined group
in circumstances where the nontreatment alternative is a 100%
certainty of death, we deem, apparently, the treatment to be
nonexperimental. In other circumstances, the answer is more
obvious; thus, treatment of cancer with laetrile, which study
after study has failed to find efficacious to even the slightest
degree, is deemed experimental.73
The very nature of medical research requires that new treat-
ments be tested with good science before the treatments are
made available to the public for widespread consumption. As
much as we might like to make all possibly helpful treatments
available to all afflicted people, placing any and all experimen-
tal treatments within the scope of health insurance coverage
72. See Experimental Therapies for Treating Leukemia, GENESIS REPORT, Aug. 1,
1993 (reporting that some types of childhood leukemias have cure rates of 95% or
higher, but that "cure rates for the most common acute and chronic adult leukemias are
40% and less"; "so few bone marrow transplants are successful in people older than
55, who account for about half of all adult leukemia patients, that transplants are not
worth doing").
73. Although the observation that administering laetrile for cancer is experimental
would seem to be beyond serious dispute, this has not prevented the issue of whether
the use of laetrile as a treatment for cancer is covered under a health insurance policy
from being litigated. See Free v. Travelers Ins. Co., 551 F. Supp. 554 (D. Md. 1982)
(holding that insured's use of lactrile for treatment of lymphoma was not an expense
necessarily incurred and thus was not within the policy's coverage). See generally Mi-
chael G. Walsh, Annotation, Right of Medical Patient to Obtain, or Physician to Pre-
scribe, Laetrile jbr Treatment of Illness-State Cases, 5 A.L.R.4TH 219 (1981).
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would increase the cost of insurance to unaffordable levels for
obvious reasons. Indeed, there are few serious, life-threatening
illnesses for which some experimental treatments do not exist;
the insured whose only remaining hope for survival (or whose
only hope for delaying an imminent, yet inevitable death)74 is
an experimental, expensive treatment is likely to request the
treatment, even if the value of the treatment is dubious or un-
known, as long as someone else pays for it.75 Thus, almost all
health insurance policies contain exclusionary language elimi-
nating coverage for experimental treatments, and the rationale
for the exclusion is cost-containment.
Policies have variously defined "experimental or investiga-
tive" treatment and sometimes have not defined the policy
terms at all.76 Common formulations have included criteria
such as local or national professional standards, scientific stan-
dards, or standards created by independent organizations or
entities.77 In some cases, courts have refused to enforce the
exclusion on the grounds that the definition was inadequate or
lacking in sufficient detail and therefore ambiguous.78 Not
74. One court described one insured's stake in a particular treatment this way:
"[T]wenty to thirty percent of Stage IV breast cancer patients receiving HDC-ABMT
have a long-term survival rate of at least two or three years free of cancer with no
need for additional treatment. On the other hand, the Stage IV breast cancer patients
who receive conventional chemotherapy have a cancer-free outlook of zero percent."
Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mich., 517 N.W.2d 864, 869 (Mich. Ct. App.
1994).
75. If of unknown or dubious value, a treatment may also be considered not to be
"medically necessary" because of the lack of an apparent benefit. Although the subjects
are usually treated separately, here it may make sense to view them as raising a com-
mon question of "medical appropriateness." For a thoughtful treatment of the entire
area, see Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992).
76. See generally Barbara A. Fisfis, Comment, Who Should Rightfully Decide
Whether a Medical Treatment Necessarily Incurred Should be Excluded From Cover-
age Under a Health Insurance Policy Provision Which Excludes From Coverage "Ex-
perimental" Medical Treatments?, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 777 (1993); Jennifer Belk, Com-
ment, Undefined Experimental Treatment Exclusions in Health Insurance Contracts: A
Proposal for Judicial Response, 66 WASH. L. REV. 809 (1991).
77. See, e.g., Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994);
Lubeznik v. Healthchicago, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 777, 780 (I11. App. Ct. 1994) ("appropri-
ate technology assessment bodies"), appeal denied, 652 N.E.2d 343 (IlI. 1995).
78. See, e.g., Dahl-Eimers v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 1379 (1lth
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surprisingly, when insurers have found a treatment to be exper-
imental and, therefore, outside coverage by applying standards
not found in the insurance policy, courts have refused to apply
the exclusion. 79 In one recent case, the court, noting the ab-
sence of guidelines or criteria in the coverage at issue, articu-
lated its own non-exclusive list of factors to determine whether
a procedure is experimental.8 °
A troublesome aspect of the case law on the experimental
treatment exclusion is that different courts have reached differ-
ent results on virtually identical facts. A particularly prominent
example of this conflict among courts involves the refusal of
some insurers to provide coverage for bone marrow transplants
to treat certain kinds of cancers."1 Insureds have prevailed in
most cases,82 but have lost in some. 3 This means that a po-
Cir. 1993) ("considered experimental" held ambiguous because policy did not specify
who would make determination); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Va., 741 F.
Supp. 586, 589-90 (E.D. Va. 1990) (policy failed to define "experimental" or "clinical
investigative" and failed to indicate what evidence was required to classify a treatment
as experimental); Tepe v. Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Medical Servs., 893 P.2d 1323
(Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (history of plan changes culminating in exclusion was unclear
and misleading to insured, who had reasonable expectations of coverage); Taylor v.
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mich., 517 N.W.2d 864, 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) ("exper-
imental" and "research in nature" are ambiguous).
79. See, e.g., Kekis v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utica-Watertown, Inc., 815 F.
Supp. 571, 578 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (insurer used wrong definition of "experimental");
Pirozzi v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 591 (E.D. Va. 1990) (use of
technical evaluation was unacceptable because such criteria were not specified in poli-
cy).
80. See Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1262-64 (3d Cir. 1993)
(judgment of other insurers and medical bodies; amount of experience with the proce-
dure; demonstrated effectiveness of the procedure).
81. More specifically, the procedure is high-dose chemotherapy with autologous
bone marrow transplant, or "HDCT-ABMT." The treatment involves removing part of
a patient's bone marrow, giving the patient extremely high doses of chemotherapy, and
then replacing the bone marrow. According to a study published in the New England
Journal of Medicine, the reasons health insurers most often give for denying coverage
for BMTs for breast cancer is that the treatment is considered experimental. See Breast
Cancer: Bone-Marrow Transplants, HARVARD HEALTH LETTER, July 1, 1995. For a
discussion of this issue and other legal issues relevant to breast cancer, see Nancy A.
Wynstra, Breast Cancer: Selected Legal Issues, 74 CANCER SUPPLEMENT 491 (July 1,
1994).
82. See, e.g., Kekis v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utica-Watertown, Inc., 815 F.
Supp. 571 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Md., Inc., 757 F.
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tentially life-or-death coverage determination-because, absent
insurance coverage, few insureds have the personal resources to
pay for the expenses of the treatment-turns on the jurisdiction
in which the insured resides.84 Moreover, the cases are diffi-
cult at another level: how "experimental" does a treatment need
to be before it is appropriate to deny coverage? Many medical
experts believe that BMT treatment for some kinds of cancer,
such as breast cancer, is not experimental, but other medical
experts disagree.85 Should the benefit of the doubt on these
Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1991); Kulakowski v. Rochester Hosp. Serv. Corp., 779 F. Supp.
710 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1418 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd,
985 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1991); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586
(E.D. Va. 1990); Tepe v. Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Medical Servs., 893 P.2d 1323
(Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Lubeznik v. Healthchicago, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 777 (II1. App. Ct.
1994), appeal denied, 652 N.E.2d 343 (I11. 1995); Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Mich., 517 N.W.2d 864 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
83. See, e.g., Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993);
Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1993); Holder v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co. of Am., 951 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1992). For more discussion, see Paul E.
Pongrace III, Comment, HDC/ABMT: Experimental Treatment or Cure All? (Ask the
Insurance Companies), 2 J. PHARM. & L. 329 (1994).
84. The problem, however, may have deeper roots. A 1994 study reported on the
process through which insurers approve the treatment with high-dose chemotherapy and
autologous bone marrow transplantation of breast cancer patients in grant-sponsored
clinical trials. It concluded that the predetermination process was "arbitrary and capri-
cious," "did not correlate with protocol-based medical decision making," and "was a
barrier to obtaining treatment." The study noted "substantial inconsistency in the fre-
quency of approval of coverage both among insurers and between decisions made by
some individual insurers, even for patients in the same study protocol." William P. Pe-
ters & Mark C. Rogers, Variation in Approval by Insurance Companies of Coverage
for Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation for Breast Cancer, 330 N. ENG. J. MED.
473 (Feb. 17, 1994).
85. The difficulty in determining when experimental treatment becomes customary
therapy is starkly illustrated by the dissension over the utility of BMTs, accompanied
by high-dose chemotherapy, for the treatment of breast cancer. Breast cancer strikes
more than one out of every ten women at some time in their lives. More than 180,000
new cases are diagnosed annually. Each year more than 45,000 women succumb to
breast cancer, making it the leading cause of death (as of 1990) among women in the
United States. Wynstra, supra note 81, at 491 (citing E.J. Feur, The Lifetime Risk of
Developing Breast Cancer, 85 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 892 (1993)). It is estimated that
about one-third of those who die might be good candidates for BMT treatment, which
would cost $2.25 billion annually. Marilyn Chase, Medical Quandary: Breast-Cancer
Patients Seeking New Therapy Face Tough Obstacles, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1993, at
Al, A9. Expert opinion on whether the treatment is superior to conventional therapy is
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issues always cut in favor of coverage? "Who" decides whether
a treatment is experimental? How many experts must share the
view that the treatment has progressed from experimental to
conventional in order for the exclusion to be rendered inappli-
cable? And when experts disagree, how does a court select the
"correct" expert opinion?
The numerous cases contesting insurers' determinations that
BMT treatment for breast cancer is experimental and, therefore,
outside coverage have prompted some insurers to revise the
exclusionary language. Like Great Benefit Life in The Rain-
maker,8 6 some insurers have attempted to make the experimen-
tal exclusion more precise by actually listing the particular
procedures that are not covered.87 Thus, if a bone marrow
transplant is listed as an excluded procedure, there is no room
for the court to find the policy ambiguous and to proceed to
interpret the policy in a way that provides coverage." That in-
surers would attempt to draft clearer exclusions in the face of
judicial repudiation of insurers' interpretations of more general
exclusions should be expected; that has been the normal course
of things for many decades. But in this context, the drafting of
divided. See Breast Cancer. Bone-Marrow Transplants, HARVARD HEALTH LETTER,
July 1, 1995, at 1 ("The procedure is costly, controversial, and traumatic and is not as
successful as some research physicians had hoped."). The mortality rate from the treat-
ment itself is 1% to 5%, but many experts believe that the treatment increases longevi-
ty beyond what is possible with conventional therapy. Because the treatment has been
in use for barely a decade, long-term follow-up studies have not yet been possible. Id.
It has been suggested that BMT is routinely covered for some rare forms of cancer,
such as testicular cancer, where there is less evidence of BMT's utility than with breast
cancer, but insurers do not contest coverage because the treatment is less frequent and
therefore less costly. Chase, supra, at Al.
86. See GRISHAM, supra note 1, at 311.
87. See Patricia Anstett, Cancer Patients Battle With Insurers, HOUSTON CHRONI-
CLE, July 5, 1995 (reporting that Blue Cross in Michigan has recently issued "riders"
that approve payment for BMTs to treat a half-dozen kinds of leukemia and related
blood cancers, but which reject payment for the treatment in all other common cancers;
an insured or employer can purchase a policy covering all BMTs, but most employers
decline the more expansive coverage because of its high cost). For the text of such a
policy, see Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 792 F. Supp. 674, 678 (D.S.D.
1992), rev'd, 995 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1993).
88. See, e.g., Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 999 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1993);
Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1993).
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unambiguous treatment-specific exclusions carries with it the
risk that BMT might be excluded as a treatment altogether,
which then might deprive leukemia patients-for whom the
treatment, though expensive, is not experimental-from relief
from what is otherwise a certainly fatal disease.89 With so
much at stake, it is not surprising that clear drafting only shifts
the legal context in which the exclusion's validity is contested.
In recent cases, insureds have argued, with some success, that
explicit exclusions of coverage for high-dose chemotherapy
treatment accompanied by BMT for most cancers violates the
Americans with Disabilities Act.9° Insurers that continue to
find themselves on the losing end of the coverage battle must
surely be wondering what they must do to eliminate coverage
for experimental treatments and to secure their cost-containment
objectives.
89. See Joyce Price, Bone Marrow Transplants Gain Favor But Insurance Often
Won't Pay, WASH. TIMES, June 20, 1994, at A10 ("there have been isolated cases
where insurance providers have denied coverage of HDC/BMT to treat diseases such as
leukemia, where its benefits have been proven in clinical trials"); Michelle Slatalla,
Leukemia Aid Denied, NEWSDAY, April 28, 1994, at A8 (reporting on a 28-year-old
leukemia patient who was denied insurance coverage for a BMT; "experts say the con-
troversy over whether to cover experimental marrow transplants for breast cancer pa-
tients may be creating a backlash against the long-accepted practice of covering the
procedure for leukemia patients"). In In re Gonzalez, 621 A.2d 94 (N.J. Super. 1992),
the issue addressed by the court was how surplus monies in a fund created by public
donations to defray the decedent's operative procedure should be disposed. According
to the court, the decedent was diagnosed as suffering from acute leukemia in 1987, and
the treating physicians recommended a BMT. Id. at 94. The insurer denied coverage on
the basis that a BMT was experimental treatment for leukemia. Id. at 95. Gonzalez
died before a BMT, which was to have been funded by private donations, was per-
formed. Id. at 94.
90. In Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1995), the court
reversed a district court's denial of a preliminary injunction that would order an ERISA
health plan to provide coverage for an HDCT-BMT treatment. The insured argued that
because the plan covered the treatment for cancers for which it is an accepted treat-
ment, denying the treatment for breast cancer wzs discrimination based on disability
type and that such discrimination is prohibited by the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990). Henderson, 70 F.3d at 960. The court agreed that
the insured's "argument has a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits." Id.; cf
Hilliard v. BellSouth Medical Assistance Plan, No. CIV. A 3:95-CV-793WS, 1995 WL
815238, at *10 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (denying insured's request for preliminary injunction
that would order HDCT-BMT for multiple myeloma and distinguishing Henderson).
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IV. DONNY RAY REVISITED: SOME LESSONS FOR US
Although the different exclusions and coverage provisions
put in play in The Rainmaker have different dimensions, the
provisions share a common purpose: each seeks to match the
amount of coverage provided with premiums collected. When-
ever an insurer acts properly to deny needed coverage to an in-
sured, the insurer acts to contain costs, thereby making insur-
ance affordable to other people who would not otherwise have
any coverage. But the consequence of maintaining affordability
involves denying coverage to some people who then may re-
ceive no care, and who on that account will suffer, and per-
haps die, from their untreated illness.
Perhaps our society can reach a consensus that all health
insurance policies should cover bone marrow transplants as a
treatment for acute leukemia in young adults. What then of
bone marrow transplants for older persons, where the cure rate
is lower? What then of bone marrow transplants and high-dose
chemotherapy for all breast cancer patients? And what about
the uninsureds-should access be provided to them? As more
coverage is mandated, the cost of insurance must increase; as
the cost increases, both access and affordability decline. But to
the extent coverage increases, the demand for covered care
increases, and this increased demand causes further increases in
the price of health care, thereby making health care less afford-
able. The less affordable health care becomes, the more each of
us needs insurance, which in turn costs more because health
care costs increase, and so on.
Once the potential of the private-market insurance mecha-
nism to provide health services at affordable costs is exhausted,
the government can be asked to provide these services. But
unless we are prepared to shrink other governmental programs,
such as defense, entitlements, social welfare, education, prisons,
or highways, the amount of governmental resources that can be
devoted to health care is finite, and this means that there will
be insufficient funds to meet all the health care needs of every-
one in our country. In turn, this means that choices must be
made about what kinds of health care services will be provided
to whom. Stated otherwise, we must concede that some people
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will not receive care for some medical conditions, and then we
must decide who those people are.
Many of these choices are extremely hard because lives
hang in the balance. Where, for example, does Donny Ray
Black fit in the calculus? Actually, his case is easy; the treat-
ment Great Benefit Life denied him is accepted as standard
therapy, and insurers routinely provide coverage in circumstanc-
es like his. But The Rainmaker, in presenting us with an easy
coverage question, invites us to think about the much more
difficult questions--questions that take us to the heart of the
fundamental issues confronting our current health care sys-
tem-where we must make choices about how health care re-
sources should be allocated. More importantly, Donny Ray's
story makes clear that the allocative choices, far from being
avoidable, are being made right now in our current health care
system, where health care is rationed and allocated, where ac-
cess to excellent care is provided to some and denied entirely
to others, where people just like the fictional Donny Ray Black
prepare to bid farewell to their futures on account of lack of
access to health care that could preserve their existence.
The access and affordability imperatives that confronted
Donny Ray Black are the same ones confronting our health
care system today. At the least, we can hope that we will find
answers more easily for our nation's health care problems than
Donny Ray was able to find for his. If we fail in our effort,
we may discover all too soon that Donny Ray is, indeed, one
of us.
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